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PART IV 
NEW RESULTS IN NONLINEAR PREFERENCE THEORY 
The dozen papers in this part illustrate the diversity and applicability 
of nonlinear preference and utility theories. Chew, Segal, and Nan 
generalize earlier nonlinear theories in interesting ways. The papers by 
LaValle & Fishburn, Chew & Epstein, Nakamura, Gilboa, Hazen, and 
Kami & Safra analyze and consider application of various nonlinear 
theories. The other three papers are primarily expository: Bhime et al. 
lead off with a tour through lexicographic choice models under un- 
certainty; Quiggin offers a survey of nonlinear models that is organized 
by alternative notions of dominance and independence; and LaValle 
concludes Part IV by identifying the class of nonlinear models for 
decision under uncertainty in which complex outcomes can be replaced 
by simpler proxies without violating basic preferences between acts. 
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This overview focuses on lexicographic choice under conditions of uncertainty. 
First, lexicographic versions of traditional (yon Neumann-Morgenstern) expected 
utility theory are described where the usual Archimedean axiom is weakened. The 
role of these lexicographic variants in explaining some well-known '~paradoxes" of 
choice theory is reviewed. Nexl, the significance of lexicographic choice for game 
theory is discussed. Finally, some texicographic extensions of the classical maximin 
decision rule are described. 
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n  
An underlying theme in most of the economic theory of choice behavior is 
the notion that it is always possible to induce a person to give up some part of a 
commodity which he possesses in exchange for some amount of  a second commodity. 
This theme of  substitutability, which goes back at least to Edgeworth, finds a counter- 
part in modern treatments of  choice theory in a "continuity" or "Archirnedean" axiom. 
When combined with the other axioms of "rational" choice, this axiom implies the 
existence of a real-valued utility function with which to represent choice behavior. 
Starting with Debreu's [15] pioneering work, many rigorous treatments of the 
question of  the existence of  a real-valued utility function have been provided. 
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One strand in the development of choice theory has centered on the implica- 
tions of  weakening, or even entirely abandoning, the continuity axiom. It has been 
argued that unlike the other axioms of rational choice (axioms of completeness, 
transitivity, and reflexivity), the continuity axiom is of a somewhat unpleasant 
existential nature and has perhaps been assumed for reasons more of mathematical 
convenience than behavioral validity (Richter [46] ). Areas in which non-Archimedean 
choice theory has proved insightful include insurance, portfolio selection, and resolu- 
tions of  the Allais "paradox" (section 2), game theory (section 3), and maximin-like 
choice criteria to capture the notion of "ignorance" (section 4). 
Chipman [9] states a very general result on the representation of non- 
Archimedean choice behavior: a complete, transitive, and reflexive preference relation 
on any set X can be represented by a lexicographic order* on (possibly transfinite) 
sequences of real numbers, where each element of X is associated with one such 
sequence. An alternative representation is possible using nonstandard analysis 
(Richter [46], Skala [51 ],  Narens [45, Chs. 4 - 6 ] ) .  In this survey, the lexicographic 
approach is emphasized, and henceforth the terms "non-Archimedean" and "lexico- 
grapltic" will be used interchangeably. 
This survey focuses on lexicographic choice under conditions of uncertainty. 
For an overview of non-Archimedean utility theory, which is less specialized than the 
one in this paper, the reader is referred to the comprehensive survey by Fishbum [23]. 
Section 2 of  this paper first reviews the traditional yon Neumann-Morgenstern 
expected utility theory, and then shows how a lexicograpltic representation arises if 
the usual Archimedean axiom is modified or dropped. Section 3 explains how the 
notion of lexicographic choice arises naturally in game theory. Section 4 is a brief 
survey of some lexicographic choice criteria which have been proposed for situations 
of "complete uncertainty", i.e, when the decision maker is "unable" to assess a 
subjective probability distribution. 
This paper is only an overview of work on lexicographic choice; it does not 
pretend to describe the technical results in any detail. We have also borrowed from 
several papers, which will be mentioned, and have depended particularly on the work 
of Chipman and Fishburn. 
2. Lex icograph ic  von  N e u m a n n - M o r g e n s t e r n  e x p e c t e d  u t i l i ty  
This section begins with a review of the usual expected utility theory. The 
exposition follows that of Fishburn [24]. The individual has a weak preference 
relation ~ over the set P of probability distributions on a finite ~ set C = Ic I . . . .  ,c  n} 
*An example of a Icxicographic order is the order of words in a dictionary. As Chipman [10] 
notes, the concept of a lexicographic order was implicit in Cantor's work. In economics, the idea 
of a lexicographic utility function was mentioned in yon Neumann and Morgenstern ([54, p. 631 ] ). 
C:l:or case of exposition, finiteness assumptions will often be made in this paper. 
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o f  consequences. Let p(c)  denote the probability that gamble p E P assigns to 
consequence c E C. The set P is made into a mixture space by defining, for p, q E P 
and 0 ~< a ~ 1, ap + ( 1 -  a)q to be the gamble which assigns probability 
ap(c)  + (1 - o~)q(c) to each c E C. ~' Letting ~ and - denote strict preference and 
indifference, the following axioms comprise the yon Neumann -Morgenstern expected 
utility theory, 
A1. (Order axiom) } is a complete, transitive, reflexive binary relation on P. 
A2. (Independence axiom) For all p, q, r E P and 0 < a ~< I, if p ~ (resp. Z.)q, 
then ap  + (1 - a) r ~ (resp. 1-) aq + (1 - a)r. 
A3. (Archimedean axiom) If p ~ q ~ r, then there exists 0 ~< 3' ~< 1 such that 
3'p + (1 - 3')r - q. 
A real-valued function u on P is said to be linear if u (~p  + ( 1 -  ~)q) 
= otu(p) + (1 - oOu(q) for all p, q E P and 0 ~< a ~< 1. The representation theorem 
can now be stated. 
PROPOSITION 2.1 
Axioms A1 - A 3  hold if and only if there is a linear function u : P -*/R such 
that, for all p, q E P, p ~ q < = >  u(p )  >t tt(q). Furthermore, u is unique up to 
positive affine transformations. 
The uniqueness statement in proposition 2.1 means that a linear function 
u t : P ~ / R  represents the same preferences as does u if and only if u t = au + b for 
real numbers a > 0, b. To express u in the more familiar expected utility form, define 
u on C as well by u(c)  = u(p) ,  where p(c )  = 1. Then the linearity o f  u means that 
i t(p) can be written as 
n 
u(p) = Y, p(ci)u(c i) for all p ~/~.  
t = I  
If  the Archimedean axiom (A3) is dropped, a numerical representation of  
preferences is no  longer possible. Instead, to each gamble is assigned a vector o f  
expected utilities, and these vectors are ordered using the lexicographic ordering 
>L 'e The vector o f  expected utilities is calculated by taking expectations under the 
*Strictly speaking, this definition only establishes P as a mixture set (Fishburn [24, p. 11] ). This 
is sufficient for the Archimedean theory, but for the non-Archimedean case, a further require- 
merit is needed, namely, that P be a mixture space. (This terminology is from Hausner [29] .) For 
a precise statement of the requirement, see Fishburn [24, p. 39, axiom M5]. All the mixture sets 
considered in this paper are also mixture spaces. 
a >L b if and only if there is an i such that a i > b t and a] = b] for all ] < i. 
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gamble o f  a lexicographic hierarchy of  utility functions. A similar representation -- for 
the ease o f  partially ordered preferences - can be found in Fishbum [24, p. 60, 
theorem 5.5].  
PROPOSITION 2.2 
Axioms A1 and A2 hold if and only if there are linear functions ul . . . . .  u K 
on P, for some integer K, such that, for all p, q E P, 
p k q < = >  [u l (p)  . . . . .  ur(p)]  [ u l ( q ) , . . .  ,uK(q)].  
Without loss o f  generality, K < n. Furthermore, each u k is unique up to affine trans- 
formations o f  u~ . . . .  ,u k which assign positive weight to ug. 
The uniqueness part o f  the proposition means that utility functions u'l, • • •, ulc 
represent the same preferences as do u 1 . . . .  , u K i f  and only if for each k, 
k 
= Y. + l,,,, 
]=1 
where a~l . . . .  ,akk , b k E ~ with ak~ > 0. 
The reason why the lexicographic hierarchy of  utility functions can be restricted 
to n - 1 (or fewer) levels rests on the fact that  in an (n - l)-dirnensional space, 
namely P, at most  n - 1 vectors can be linearly independent. In fact, a complete 
p roof  o f  proposition 2.2 using linear algeabra can be based on the construction o f  
Hausner [29] .  We will provide a sketch o f  an alternative method of  proof,  based on 
a successive separation argument, which is perhaps more illuminating as to how 
the lexicographic representation arises. The same argument has been used by 
Fishbum [24, sect. 5 .6] ,  whose exposition is followed here, and Myerson [44, lemma 2] ,  
among others. A gamble p E P will be represented by the vector [ p ( c  1 ) , . . .  , p  (c  n _ 1 )] 
E ~R n - 1. Let H be the convex cone in ~ n  - 1 generated by {p - q : p, q E P with 
p ~ q}'. Clearly, 0 ~ H. The crucial step is to show that there are vectors v I . . . . .  o K 
in ~R n - 1, where K ~< n - 1, such that (v  1 .  a , . . .  ,o  K .  a)  >L 0 for a E H. The ith 
component  o f  o k is to be interpreted as the k th  order utility o f  the lottery that gives 
consequence c i for sure. This follows by  successive separation. The separating hyper- 
plane theorem implies that there is a v 1 E ~ n  - 1 such that o I • a I> 0 for all a E H, 
with strict inequality for some a E H.  I~et H 1 = H N {a E/R n -  1 : o l .  a = 0t. The 
set H 1 is again a convex cone in R n -  1 with 0 ~ H 1 , so there is a o 2 ~ ~ n  - 1 
such that o 2 • a I> 0 for all a E H 1, with strict inequality for some a E H 1 . Let 
H 2 =  H 1 n {a E ~ R n - l : o 2  . a  = 0}. Continuing in this fashion establishes that 
there are vectors v 1 , . . . , v K ,  where K ~< n - 1 since the dimension o f  the H k ' s  
is strictly decreasing, such that (01 • a . . . . .  o K .a )  >L 0 for a E H. It only remains 
to def'me the yon Neumann-Morgens tern  utility function uk, for k = 1 , . . .  ,K, by 
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n - 1  
uk<p) -'- o pCc ). 
i = l  
If the space of consequences C is infinite, then a lexicographic representation 
along the lines of that of proposition 2.2 is still possible. One route, which is taken in 
Fishbum [22], [24, p. 39, theorem 4.4], is to adopt an extra axiom which has the 
effect of restricting the lexicographic hierarchy to finitely many levels. Without this 
additional axiom, an infinite-dimensional representation may be necessary (and can 
be b ased on the arguments of Hausner and Wendel [30]). 
Several authors have discussed applications of lexieographic expected utility. 
Chipman [11] considers the implications for portfolio crtoiee of dropping the 
Archimedean axiom. He showshow "ruin" (e.g. bankruptcy) and "aspiration levels" 
can be modeled. Suppose, for example, that the consequences c~ . . . .  ~c n represent 
possible wealth levels, where c 1 is negative (i.e. ~ruin") and c 2 , . . . ,  c n are positive. 
A possible two-level lexicographie representation is: 
ul  (c l )  = 0 
u l(ci) = 1 for i = 2 , . . . , n ;  
u 2 (cl) = -1  
u 2(ct) = i for i = 2 , . . . , n .  
Gamble p will be preferred to gamble q if and only if 
P(Ci)' -P(Cl)  + ~" P(ct)i  >L q(cl)' --q(cl) +i q(ct)i " 
t i = 2  t = 2  
In other words, u I , u 2 represent a policy of minimizing the probability of ruin and, 
among gambles with equal probability of ruin, maximizing expected wealth..A similar 
two-level lexicographic representation can be used to model the policy of maximizing 
the probability of achieving some aspiration wealth level w and, among gambles with 
equal probability of achieving w, maximizing expected utility. Chipman [ l l ]  offers 
this second type of behavior as an alternative resolution to that provided by Friedman 
and Savage [26] of the "paradox" of" simultaneous gambling and insurance 
purchases. More generally, any preference relation defined in terms of whether a 
constraint is or is not met can be represented lexicographically. Engamacion [18,19], 
Ferguson [20,21], and Thrall [53] discuss other instances of this phenomenon. 
A slightly different form oflexicographic choice theory, based on the expected 
utility framework reviewed at the beginn'mg of this section, is developed in Gilboa [27]. 
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Rather than simply dropping the Arclfimedean axiom A3, Gilboa proposes a different 
set of axioms which includes a modification of A2 as well as of A3. These axioms 
characterize a lexicographic decision rule - the first component being maximin, the 
second a combination of maximin and expected utility. Gilboa offers his approach 
as an alternative resolution of the Allais *paradox" (Allais [1]) to other resolutions 
which weaken or drop the von Neumann-Morgenstern independence axiom (see 
Machina [36], Chew [8], Fishburn [25], Dekel [ t6 ] ,  Yaari [55], among others). 
3. Lex icograph ic  cho ice  in games 
This section will trace the development of a lexicographic approach to refine- 
ments of Nash equilibrium. The program of refning the set of Nash equilibria in the 
context of  extensive-form games was initiated by Selten [49]. He demonstrated that 
a Nash equilibrium may be supported by off-the-equilibrium-path behavior which is 
implausible, and proposed instead the concept of  subgame-perfect equilibrium as a 
way to eliminate such implausible equilibria. A Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect 
if its component strategies induce a Nash equilibrium in every subtree of the original 
tree. Subgame perfection is in a sense a multi-person version of the backwards induction 
principle of single-person decision theory. 
Kreps and Wilson [34] proposed the idea of a sequential equilibrium as a 
refinement of  subgame perfection. The definition of a sequential equilibrium has two 
parts. The first part is ~sequential rationality": for each information set I in the tree, 
the strategy of the player who moves at I must prescribe a choice which is optimal 
given some probability distribution over the nodes in I (and given the strategies of  
the other players). The key aspect of this definition is the specification of beliefs 
at eveJy information set in the tree - even at those which have zero '~prior" proba- 
bility of being reached under the equilibrium strategies. The second part of the 
definition of a sequential equilibrium is a consistency requirement on how the players' 
strategies and their beliefs at the various information sets are related. 
Kreps and Wilson give the term "lexicographic consistency" to one of the 
consistency requirements which they impose on beliefs.* Roughly speaking, lexico- 
graphic consistency demands that there be a sequence o~ . . . . .  o K of alternative strategy 
profiles (representing alternative beliefs as to how the game is played), and that this 
sequence be used in lexicographic fashion to assign beliefs to information sets in the 
tree. That is, the first ("base-case") strategy profile o~ is used to calculate beliefs at 
all information sets to which o 1 assigns positive probability. Next, a 2 is used to 
calculate beliefs at as many remaining information sets as possible. And so on. The 
notion of lexicographic consistency indicates an appealing way to analyze refinements 
*See Kreps and Wilson [34, p.874]. Actually, there are some subtleties associated with their 
definition of texicographic consistency - see Kreps and Ramey [35]. 
L. Blume et aL, Lexicographic choice under uncertainty 237 
of Nash equilibrium: a player can be thought of as having a lexicographic hierarchy 
of beliefs, and uses this hierarchy in some fashion to compute an optimal strategy. 
The remainder of  this section of  the paper will be devoted to reviewing some recent 
work which makes precise this perspective on refinements, and gives it an axiomatic 
foundation. 
Myerson [42,43] approached this question by providing a formal definition 
of a system of beliefs, which he called a conditional probability system (CPS), which 
includes beliefs conditional on events of  prior probability 0. 
DEFINITION 3.1 
A conditional probability system (CPS) on a finite space ~ is a collection of 
functions p( • I S), one for each 0 :/: S C f2, such that: 
(1) p( .  IS) isaprobabili tymeasureon~2withp(SlS)= 1; 
(2) i f V C  T C  S a n d T ¢ O ,  t h e n p ( V l S ) = p ( V I T ) x p ( T l S ) .  
Myerson [43] contains an axiomatic justification for CPSs. In order to describe 
this work, and to discuss subsequent developments, it will be helpful to first review the 
conventional theory which serves as the starting point. 
An appropriate theory for analyzing the behavior of  players in a game is 
subjective expected utility theory (SEU). The idea is that each player faces a space 
of  possible states of the world, namely, the possible choices that the other players 
can make, and chooses a strategy to maximize his expected utility calculated accord- 
ing to his subjective probability distribution on the states. The foundational work 
on SEU is, of  course, that of Savage [48]. However, for the purpose of analyzing 
finite games, the version due to Anscombe and Aumann [2] is more convenient; 
it is this theory, which we now review. 
As in sect. 2, let P be the set of  probability distributions on a finite set C of 
consequences. The individual has a weak preference relation ~ on P~,  where f~ is a 
finite set of  states. If  act x E P a  is chosen, and state co occurs, then the consequence 
is the gamble xw E P, where x~o is the coth component of  x. The set P ~  is made into 
a mixture space by defining, for x, y E Pa and 0 ~< a ~< 1, ~x + (1 - a)y to be the 
act which, if state co occurs, assignsprobabitity ~x~o (c) + (1 - a)Y~o (e) to each e E C. 
Given an event S C ~ ,  let x s be the tuple (xw)w E s and x_ s - x ~  _ s-  Letting 
and "~ denote strict preference and indifference, the following axioms comprise 
the Anscombe and Aumann theory. 
Bt. (Order axiom) ~ is a complete, transitive, reflexive binary relation on P a .  
B2. (Independence axiom) For all x, y, z E P a  and 0 < a ~< 1, if x ¢ (resp. Z)y ,  
then ax + (1 - a)z ~ (resp. Z )ay + (1 - a)z. 
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B3. (Non-triviality axiom) There are x,y  E pS~ such that x ~ y.  
B4. (Archimedean axiom) If x ~ y ~ z, then there exists 0 ~< 3' ~< 1 such that 
3 ' x + ( 1 - 7 ) z  - y .  
We next define conditional preferences (Savage [48] ) and null events. 
DEFINITION 3.2 
x ~S Y if for some z E P~ ,  (Xs, Z_s) ~ (Ys,  Z-s).* 
DEFINITION 33 
The event S C ~2 is null if x "S Y for all x, y E psi .  
B5. (State-independence axiom) For all states 6o, 6o' E ~2 which are non-null, and 
for any two acts x, y E P~  with xto = xto,, Yo~ = Yto', x ~{to}Y if  and only if 
x  l ,ly. 
PROPOSITION 3.1 (Anscombe and Aumann [2] and Fishbum [24, p. 111, theorem 9.2] ) 
Axioms B1 -B5 hold if and only if there is a linear function u : P ~ #~ and a 
probability measure p on ~2 such that, for all x, y ~ psi ,  
x k y <--> Z p(6o)u(x ) >1 Z p(6o)u(y ). 
oaEI2 oaEg~ 
Furthermore, u is unique up to positive affine transformations, p is unique, and 
p(S)  = 0 if and only if the event S is null. 
Returning to the theme of this section, Myerson [43] augments the conven- 
tional theory by supposing that the decision maker has, in addition to the preference 
relation 5 on p a ,  a preference relation ~s  on pS for each non-empty subset S of ~2. 
It is important to note that these additional preferences ~s  with which Myerson 
endows the decision maker are not the conditional preferences of definition 3.2, but 
are, a priori, quite distinct preference relations. Myerson supposes that each preference 
8 ~s satisfies the analogs to axioms B1 -B5  on the space P , and hence each ~s  can be 
represented by a utility function u s : P -~ ~ and a probability measure p ( .  I S) on S. 
Myerson then shows that, by specifying further axioms on how the various ~s  are 
related, one can conclude that there is a single utility function (u s = u for all S) and 
that the collection of probability measures {p(.  I S) : ¢ 4: S c ~2} is a CPS. 
*The relation ~8 is well defined since by axioms B1 and B2 the definition is independent of z. 
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Notice that at no point has the Archimedean axiom B4 been weakened, so 
that the representation which emerges cannot be lexicographic in nature. Nevertheless, 
a lexicographic character can be introduced by specifying above and beyond the 
preference relations }s  a rule for how the representation should be applied. Consider 
the following example. Suppose p ( .  I f~) has support S, where S is a strict subset 
of ~ ,  and p ( .  1~2 - S )  has support gZ - S .  Let X be a non-empty, finite subset of 
acts from p a  that is closed under subjective mixtures with resoect to the partition 
{S, ~2 - S}.* According to the preference relation }, an act x E X is optimal if and 
only if it yields at least as much expected utility, calculated under the probability 
measure p( -  I I2) (which is the same as the measure p( -  l S)), as does any other act 
y E X. As an alternative, one could bring the preference relation } a -  s into the 
picture as well, by specifying the following rule for optimality: x E X is optimal if and 
only if: 
p ( w t S )  [u(xto) - u(yto)] >t 0 
toGS 
and 
p(eol~2 - S) [u(xw) - u(Y~o)] 1> 0 
to EI2-S 
for all y E X. This role for applying CPSs faithfully captures the two key features of 
sequential equilibrium discussed earlier. Sequential rationality is captured by requiring 
that x be optimal not only conditional on S, but also conditional on ~2 - S, where 
the latter has "prior" probability 0. Lexicographic consistency is captured in the way 
that first p ( -  1 S) and then p ( .  t ~2 - S) are used to assign beliefs. The paper by 
McLennan [38] makes precise how CPSs can be used to characterize sequential 
equilibrium, and also provides an existence proof using CPSs. 
A thoroughgoing axiomatic approach would derive the lexicographic ranking 
of acts implicit in the optimality rule just described from the decision maker's basic 
preference relation ~.  Such an approach would also be more parsimonious: the 
preferences 2 s ,  for ~ ~ S C [2, could be deduced from - rather than postulated in 
addition to - the basic preference relation ~.* An explicitly texicographic approach 
will now be described. 
In the yon Neumann-Morgenstern framework of sect. 2, the lexieographic 
expected utility representation consisted of a hierarchy of utility functions 
(proposition 2.2). The representation which is appropriate for the objectives discussed 
in this section consists of a single utility function u :P ~ R but a lexicographic 
hierarchy of probability measures. 
*That is, if x, y E X, then (xS, y~-S) ~ X. 
In fact, ~,~ will turn out to be precisely the conditional preference relation given S. 
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DEFINITION 3.4 
A lexicographic probability system (LPS) on a finite space gZ is a K-tuple 
X = (p~ . . . . .  p/c), for some integer K, of  probability distributions on f2 such that 
for every co E g2, pk(co) > 0 for some k. ~ 
With this representation, an act x will be preferred to an act y ,  according to 
the basic preference relation ~, if and only if 
[ ~-~ Pk(e°)u(xw >11. Pk(W)U(Yw 
t o E a ' 2  k = l  ,.,3 52 k = l  
(*). 
To see how this representation embodies the optimality rule described above, 
consider a two-level LPS }t= (Pl ,P2), where P I ( ' )  = P("  I S) and P 2 ( ' )  = P("  [ ~2 - S). 
Then, x ~ y if and only if 
[ Z~o~sPl(C°)[u(x~o)-u(Yw)], co~a-s~' P2(C°)[u(xw)-u(Yt°)]] 
lexicographically exceeds (0, 0). 
The representation (*)  is a natural extension of the lexicographic expected 
utility representation of  proposition 2.2 to the richer environment of  SEU. We now 
turn to the relationship between CPSs and LPSs. 
DEFINITION 3.5 
A lexicographic conditional probability system (LCPS)is an LPS (Px . . . .  ,PK) 
in which the supports of  the pk's are disjoint and for every 6o E ~2, p k ( ~ )  > 0 for 
some k. 
An example of  an LCPS is the LPS X constructed above. Although we have 
seen that the preference structures underlying CPSs and LCPSs are different, the 
second being genuinely lexicographic while the first is not, there is nevertheless a 
natural equivalence between the probabilities in the two structures. More formally, 
the spaces of  CPSs and LCPSs are isomorphic, as we now demonstrate. Given a CPS 
{p(" I S ) :  ¢ 4= S C ~2}, an LCPS X = (Pl ,  - • • ,P/c) can be defined as follows (here, 
Supp denotes the support of  a measure): 
¢'This definition of an LPS rules out null events (definition 3.3). The more general case in which 
null events are permitted is treated in Blume et al. [7]. 
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Pl = P ( "  l a )  
p2 = P ( "  IN~), 
P3 = P(" IN2), 
where N 1 = g~ - Suppp( .  I g2) 
where N 2 = N 1 - Suppp( .  IN 1) 
The sequence of pk's will terminate at some PK such that Supp PK =NK- t- The 
number of levels K in the LCPS X is finite since the Nk's are strictly decreasing and 
g2 is finite. Conversely, given an LCPS X = (Pl . . . . .  Pr ), a CPS {p ( .  I S) : 0 4= S C g2 } 
can be defined as follows. For 0 ¢ S C fZ, let k ( S ) =  min{k :pk(S) > 0}and for 
each co E g2 define p(tolS) = pk(s)(Co)/Pk(s)(S). The probability distribution p ( .  IS) 
defined in this way is readily seen to satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of definition 3.1. 
The more general space of LPSs is equivalent to the set of all convex 
combinations, in an appropriate sense, of LCPSs. Given two LCPSs X = ( p ~ , . . .  ,PK ) 
and p =(ql  . . . . .  qK), both of length K, and 0 < t~< 1, define ~X +(1 - a ) p  
= [Otpl + ( I  - -  ~ ) q l  . . . . .  OtPK + (1 -- a)q K ] ~" Clearly, according to this definition 
the convex combination of two LCPSs need not be an LCPS, but it will be an LPS. 
It is the larger space of LPSs that turns out to be the one suitable for 
analyzing refinements of Nash equilibrium, such as (normal-form) perfect equilibrium 
(Selten [50]) and proper equilibrium (Myerson [41]) which are defined on the 
normal, as opposed to the extensive, form. In fact, the following three issues appear 
related: (1) the property that convex combinations of LCPSs may be LPSs; (2) the 
appropriateness of LCPSs for extensive-form refinements and of LPSs for normal- 
form refinements; and (3) questions of normal-form equivalence (see Dalkey [14], 
Elmes and Remy [t 7] ,Kohlbergand Mertens [32], Mertens [39], and Thompson [52] ). 
We believe that the precise relationship between (1), (2), and (3) merits further research. 
An axiomatic characterization of subjective expected utility with lexicographic 
hierarchies of beliefs, i.e. the representation (*) above, has been developed by Blume 
et al. [7]. These authors go on to show how, in the context of single-person decision 
theory, this lexicographic variant of SEU provides a synthesis of both admissibility 
(Luce and Raiffa [35, Ch. 13]) and backwards induction with expected utility. They 
also show how SEU with lexicographic beliefs can be used to characterize the normal- 
form refinements: (normal-form) perfect equilibrium (Selten [50]) and proper equi- 
librium (Myerson [41]). The topological properties of lexicographic representations 
have been investigated by McLennan [38] and Hammond [28]. For the case of CPSs, 
McLennan has demonstrated a useful topology in terms of extended log-likelihood 
~This definition may require further refinement if tim pk's and qk's arc not ol'comparable "order". 
This issue will not be pursued further here. 
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ratios. Hammond [28] looks at the topological properties o f -  and the relationships 
between - the various Iexicographic belief systems discussed in this section. 
We conclude this section by mentioning the use of  a texicographic decision 
criterion in the context of  repeated games. Rubinstein [47] proves Folk theorems 
for the case in which the players evaluate streams of  payoffs using the so-called 
"overtaking" criterion.* As Rubinstein points out, the overtaking criterion does 
not have a real-valued representation; it is in fact lexicographic in nature. 
4. Lex icograph ic  decis ion rules u n d e r  " c o m p l e t e  u n c e r t a i n t y "  
This section is devoted to a brief description of some lexicographic choice 
criteria which arise in the context of decision making under conditions of so-called 
"complete uncertainty". The starting point for analysis is similar to that for SEU 
described in sect. 3. The decision maker is faced with a number of alternative possible 
actions to take. The consequence of  each action depends on the state of  the world 
- which is unknown to the decision maker at the time at which an action must be 
chosen. The distinguishing feature of  "complete uncertainty" is the assumption that 
the decision maker has no way of assigning subjective probabilities to states. In this 
respect, decision making under "complete uncertainty" has sometimes been claimed 
to be more faithful to the conceptions of uncertainty held by Keynes, Knight, and 
others, than is the subjective probability approach.* 
In the literature on choice under ~complete uncertainty", it is customary to 
suppose that the decision maker has a preference relation on possible consequences 
and from this to infer, by postulating various axioms, preferences over actions. There 
are two strands in the literature, distinguished according to the nature of assumptions 
made about preferences over consequences. The first strand, which includes papers 
by Milnor [40], Arrow and Hurwicz [3], Maskin [37, sect. I and II],  Cohen and 
Jaffray [12,13], and Barbera and Jackson [4], assumes a cardinal ranking of conse- 
quences. Since cardinal utility is usually derived from a set of probabilistic axioms, 
it is perhaps a strange component of  a theory that eschews probabilities. The second 
strand" of  the literature supposes only an" ordinal ranking o f  consequences; this is the 
route taken by Maskin [37, sect. III],  Barrett and Pattanaik [5],  and Kelsey [31]. 
Although the ordinal approach is the more attractive, for expositional ease we shall 
nevertheless think of  an action x as a vector of  real numbers, the ith component x i 
representing the yon Neumann-Morgenstem utility if state i occurs. 
A sequence {Xt}t_ 1 IS (strictly) preferred to a sequence{Yt}t=l according to the overtaking 
criterion if limTinf ~T= t (Xt - Yt) > O. , 
aReeently, Bewley [6], following Aumann [4], has developed a variant of SEU, which he terms 
"Knightian", in which the decision maker has a (possibly large) convex set of subjective proba- 
bility distributions. 
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The classical criterion for ranking acts under conditions of "complete un- 
certainty" is, of course, the maximin criterion (see e.g. Luce and Raiffa [35, Ch. 13] ). 
Given two acts x, y E /R  n, x is (strictly) preferred to y according to the maximin 
criterion if and only if 
m in{x i : i=  1 , . . .  ,n} > min{yi:i  = 1 , . . .  ,n}. 
The maximin criterion plays a central role in the theory of two-person zero-sum 
games. Nevertheless, maximin is a rather "weak" decision rule in that it makes no 
use of  the characteristics of  an act beyond the minimum utility that the act guarantees. 
One way to take additional information about acts into account, while remaining 
faithful to the spirit of  maximin, is to use a lexicographic criterion: Acts are first 
compared on the basis of their minimum utility levels. If deemed indifferent on this 
basis, then information about their next levels of utility is taken into account. And 
so on. Two such criteria which have been proposed in the literature are the protective 
criterion and the leximin criterion. 
To define the protective and leximin criteria, some extra notation will be 
useful. Given two acts x, y E R n, let l (x ,  y)  = {i : x i ~ Yi}. The protective criterion 
states that act x is (strictly) preferred to act y if and only if 
min /x t : i  E l(x ,  y)} > min{yi: i  E I(x,  y)}. 
This definition is best understood by means of  a simple example. Suppose x = (30, 60, 
10, 50) and y = (30, 40, 10, 70). Then x and y are deemed indifferent under maximin. 
Under the protective criterion, neither the lowest utility level of I0 nor the next 
lowest of 30 permits a distinction between x and y ,  but once attention is focused on 
the utilities in the remaining states, the guaranteed level under x exceeds that under y. 
Consider now a second example: x = (30, 60, 10, 50) and y = (30, 10, 70, 10). Here, 
x and y are ranked indifferent under the protective criterion. The leximin criterion 
works by counting the number of times the lowest utility level is realized, then if 
necessary, the number of times the next lowest is attained. And so on. Given an act 
x E/R n and a number a E • , le t  C(x, a) denote the cardinality of the set {i : x i = a}. 
Then, formally speaking, the leximin criterion states that act x E Rn is (strictly) 
preferred to act y E/R n if and only if there is a number a such that 
C(x, b) = C(y ,  b) for all b < a 
C(x, a) < C(y ,  a). 
In the second example, x is preferred to y under the leximin criterion. 
An ordinal characterization of the protective criterion has been given by 
Barrett and Pattanaik [5]. Barbera and Jackson [4] provide a cardinal axiomatization. 
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Maskin [37] gives bo th  ordinal and cardinal characterizations o f  the Ieximin criterion, 
while again Barrett  and Pattanaik,  and Barbera and Jackson, provide ordinal and 
cardinal characterizations,  respectively. The reader is referred to the paper  by  Barrett  
and Pattanalk for a comparison o f  the various different  axiom systems. 
Kelsey [31] considers the case of  "partial uncer ta in ty" ,  in which the decision 
maker  still does not  possess a subjective probabi l i ty  distr ibution on states, bu t  is able 
to rank the states in order of l ike l ihood.  A particular criterion which Kelsey character- 
izes is the lex-likelihood rule: Given two acts x, y ,  the decision maker  compares their 
utilities in the most  l ikely state. I f  the ut i l i ty o f  x is greater than that  of  y ,  then x is 
preferred. I f  the utilities are the same, then the respective utilities in the second 
most  likely state are compared.  And so on. There is an obvious formal similarity 
between this criterion and a special case o f  the lexicographic behavior discussed in 
sect. 3, in which choices are made on the basis of  expected ut i l i ty  with an LCPS 
(PJ . . . . .  PK ) in which each Pk is concentrated on a single state. 
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